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paper is the result of work done by the author for discussions sponsored by
the Catholic Health Association and the NCCB's Secretariat for Pastoral
Practices.

When the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services were published by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
new partnerships among health care organizations and providers were the
focus of many Catholic sponsored health care systems. I Catholic and
other-than-Catholic sponsored systems were in the process of forming
partnerships based on a wide range of common principles and values.
Partnerships were formed, for instance, with a focus on healthy
communities, with a concern for the underserved and health care poor, or
with a heightened sense of responsibility for the limited resources available
for health care in the community.
At another level, however, new relationships among health care
providers often revealed divergent ethical commitments. Those
commitments affect how medicine is practiced. This means that when there
is a partnership forged between a Catholic and other-than-Catholic
providers, the question of the Catholic partner's cooperation in any
proscribed procedure needs to be addressed. In the Appendix to the
Directives, the bishops detail the principles governing cooperation; these
are meant to help guide the objective analysis of partnerships involving
activities judged morally wrong by the Church.
The purpose of this article is not to explain the various distinctions
found in the principle of cooperation; nor is the purpose to review new
partnerships between variously sponsored providers in order to show how
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the principle has been effectively and legitimately applied. 2 With the proper
legal, managerial and financial structures, many new partnerships are
relatively unproblematic examples of cooperation. The purpose of this
article is twofold. First, the article analyzes with greater precision the
meaning of duress and its role in the legitimate application of the principle.
Second, the article illustrates how the element of duress can be a morally
relevant factor when dealing with provisions for sterilization in some new
partnerships. 3

What the Directives Say
As reflective of Catholic moral theology, the Directives are clear
when they state that "direct sterilization of either men or women, whether
permanent or temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care
institution when its sole immediate effect is to prevent conception"
(Directive 53). This prohibition is reflective of the kind of medicine that
has always been practiced in Catholic institutions. The Directives,
furthermore, make it clear that this absolute prohibition serves to protect
the Church's understanding of human sexuality which holds that the
unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act are inseparable. It is
one of the positive aspects of the Directives to identify this kind of moral
backing or rationale for individual proscriptions and prescriptions.
The Directives continue, however, "procedures that induce sterility
are permitted when their direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present
pathology and a simpler treatment is not available" (Directive 53). These
latter cases are known as "indirect" sterilizations and are legitimate
applications of the principle of double effect where a single act has two
effects, one good and one bad. This traditional principle is also behind
Directive 47, which concerns abortion and Directive 61, which concerns
euthanasia and pain management.
The principle of cooperation is another traditional principle that can
be used when dealing with the issue of sterilization. It is the more relevant
principle when sterilization is discussed in the context of new partnership
among health care providers. The principle of cooperation differentiates
"the action of the wrongdoer from the action of the cooperator through two
major distinctions." The first major distinction is between formal and
material cooperation. "If the cooperator intends the object of the
wrongdoer's activity, then the cooperation is formal and, therefore, morally
wrong. Since intention is not simply an explicit act of the will, formal
cooperation can also be implicit. Implicit formal cooperation is attributed
when, even though the cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer's object,
no other explanation can distinguish the cooperator's object from the
wrongdoer's object." Because the Directives are adopted as policy by every
May, 2003

151

Catholic health care service and institution, explicit formal cooperation is
not really at issue; a further explanation of implicit formal cooperation,
however, is needed to provide an objective appraisal of institutional
partnerships.
The distinction between explicit and implicit formal cooperation was
well known in the neoscholastic manuals of moral theology.4 Attention was
drawn to the distinction after a review of the November 1993 draft of the
Directives by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Following the
moral tradition, the Congregation underlined that "formal cooperation is
verified not only when somebody cooperates from conscious approval of
what a principal agent wrongly does, but also when the collaborating agent
acts in a fashion directed to the achievement of the primary agent's goal."
That is, one implicitly cooperates when "what the collaborating agent
chooses to do is only properly intelligible as directed to achieving the end!
purpose of the principal agent. One may so act without consciously
approving; indeed one may do so while telling oneself one disapproves of
what the principal agent is up to!"5 In other words, if the cooperator's
action is unequivocally determined to contribute to the wrongdoing of
another, then one's cooperation is implicitly forma\.6 Try as one may to
describe it otherwise, the cooperator's action can have no other reasonable
explanation than sharing in the wrongdoing. Nevertheless, a word of
caution is in place. If each and every circumstance or even the knowledge
that wrongdoing will occur is exaggerated, then all distinctions between
material and formal cooperation would collapse.
The second major distinction of the principle excludes intention and,
instead, deals with the object of the action. It is expressed by immediate
and mediate material cooperation. "Material cooperation is immediate
when the object of the cooperator is the same as the object of the
wrongdoer." A traditional example from medical ethics is the doctor who
performs a proscribed procedure; another example of immediate material
cooperation would be when a sterilization procedure is performed at a
Catholic health care institution. The bishops state that "immediate material
cooperation is wrong, except in some instances of duress." The bishops,
however, did not detail what they mean by duress.

The Element of Duress
Dealing with sterilizations on the basis of the principle of cooperation
highlights an important dissimilarity to earlier discussions on sterilization.
The principle of cooperation will require that there be institutional or social
factors that go beyond any medical indications for a sterilization to be
performed. "The reason for the cooperation must be something over and
beyond the sterilization itself."7 Medical indications are a necessary but not
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sufficient criteria for cooperating in a sterilization at a Catholic health care
facility. To perform a sterilization for medical indications alone cannot be
justified by Catholic moral theology. Earlier attempts to justify a
sterilization on the basis of the principle of totality do not meet the more
stringent evidentiary threshold demanded by the principle of cooperation.
That is, invoking the principle of totality to justify sterilization procedures
for medical indications fails to account for the legitimate ways of avoiding
pregnancy that are available to the patient. 8
Invoking the element of duress, then, will be based on the presence
of outside factors that have so diminished or compromised the autonomy
of the Catholic facility that greater and irreparable harm is risked if the
facility refuses to cooperate. "Material cooperation will be justified only
where the hospital because of duress or pressure cannot reasonably
exercise the autonomy is has (i.e., when it will do more harm than good) ... .
The allowance of material cooperation in extraordinary cases is based on
dangers of an even more serious evil. ..." 9
Putting aside the still evolving environment of today's health care,
there is an undeniable ambiguity inherent in any assessment of duress as it
is a factor in material cooperation. When assessing the level of duress
present in a situation, we must balance the real and feasible options
available to distance ourselves from the wrongdoing against the likelihood
of greater and irreparable harm occurring. Do we have alternatives that
would distinguish our action more clearly from the wrongdoer's so that our
cooperation would be only mediately material? Are predictions of greater
harm occurring unwarranted or does a deliberate analysis show that the
dangers are real and likely to occur? Clearly, there is the need for a
strategic weighing that takes into account not only the short term but also
the long term effects of our decisions. To guide the assessment of duress as
a morally relevant factor in our reasoning, perhaps an axiom can be formed:
the more likely it is that greater harm will occur, the more likely it is that
duress will be a factor in our application of the principle; and, the more
alternatives that we have to distance ourselves from the wrongdoing, the
less likely it is that duress will be a factor in our application of the principle.
To be sure, we cannot exaggerate what constitutes duress and that
may be a particular temptation when we see how many new partnerships
continue to be formed by health care providers. If we exaggerate the
element of duress, however, we risk cooperating in an implicit formal way.
According to the Directives, duress distinguishes immediate material
cooperation from implicit formal cooperation. "Immediate material
cooperation - without duress - is equivalent to implicit formal cooperation
and, therefore, is morally wrong." In other words, if a new partnership is
formed where there is an exaggerated understanding of duress or where
any proscribed procedure is not sufficiently distinct from the Catholic
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partner in terms of governance, management, performance and financial
benefit, the Catholic partner cooperates in an implicit formal way.IO That is,
despite efforts to do otherwise, the only legitimate explanation of the
institution's action is a direct participation in the wrongdoing.

Case of Duress
The element of duress has always been a morally relevant factor in
the application of the principle of cooperation. This, too, is evidenced in
the neoscholastic manuals of moral theology. II The paradigm case was
helping the thief rob the bank in order to avoid the loss of life; the more
fundamental good of life was weighed against the good of private property.
As a factor in the application of the principle of cooperation, however, the
element of duress was not limited to the area of justice nor was duress a
relevant factor only when human life was the good to be protected. 12 For
example, when dealing with legitimate applications of the principle of
cooperation, the manuals spoke of a woman's participation in onanistic
intercourse in order to avoid the greater harm of adultery; or giving a liquor
to a drunkard in order to prevent a brawl; or a person in need asking for a
Sacrament from a priest who is unworthy and will sin by conferring it. In
each of these cases, the legitimacy of such a strictly circumscribed
application of the principle of cooperation was found in the manual's
determination that the person's cooperation in the wrongdoing was in order
to prevent harms that could not be repaired or to protect goods that could
not otherwise be preserved.
The question, then, is whether there are situations when duress can
be a morally relevant factor when considering the institutional cooperation
of a Catholic health care facility in sterilization? Are there factors above
and beyond any medical indication for a sterilization that limit the
autonomy of the Catholic health care facility and threaten to bring about
greater and irreparable harm, such as the closing of the facility or of an
obstetrics unit which, traditionally, handled high risk pregnancies in a way
that was consistent with Catholic moral teaching? For instance, in the
context of managed care - where providers must contract with third party
payers to provide a continuum of health care services and where payers
limit the providers to which their members have access - the presence of
a Catholic facility could be jeopardized by its not being able to contract
with third party payers because it offers an insufficient range of services.
When a health care payer must decide between two institutions to provide
health care services to its members, it would seem reasonable to assume
that the area's population would prefer the provider who, while excluding
abortion services, offered the broadest range of services, particularly in the
area of gynecology and obstetrics. How would the loss of a facility or its
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obstetrics umt Impact not only the health of the community but the
Church's mission and influence in that community, perhaps one in which
there is a minority Catholic population and no other institutional Church
presence?
These questions do not have ready answers but require sober and
deliberate analysis on the part of health care and Church leaders. When that
analysis is guided by the principle of cooperation, it will account not only
for the evil that is done, but also for the good that is achieved. Is the good
valued highly enough or is there a sufficient sense of urgency to protect it
to outweigh the evil caused by our cooperation?1 3Since that evil cannot be
abolished completely, we aim to contain and limit it as much as possible.
Surely, the closer we are to the evil, the more serious a reason we must
have to cooperate; and when duress is a morally relevant factor, that reason
is not any reason, but it is that we have no feasible alternatives to prevent
greater and irreparable harm occurring. 14
Again, the issue here is not elective or voluntary sterilizations; if
those are performed, they would be clearly separate from the services
provided by a Catholic health care institution. The issue, rather, is the
performance of a sterilization under duress; that is, in a situation where the
Catholic facility has a diminished autonomy due to constrictions imposed
by factors that are above and beyond any medical indications for the
sterilization, and that threaten to bring about greater harm. Do we risk
bringing about greater and irreparable harm by losing a presence in health
care if we refuse to cooperate in a sterilization during, for instance, a
Cesarean section delivery or other abdominal surgery? If greater and
irreparable harm is calculable in such strictly circumscribed situations, we
could resolve the dilemma by having recourse to the principle of
cooperation.

The Issue of Scandal
A prudential application of the principle of cooperation will also
consider the possibility of cooperation leading to scandal. Scandal has
been traditionally defined as leading another into sin. 15 Scandal is of such
importance in the application of the principle that cooperation, which in all
other respects is morally appropriate, may be refused because of the
scandal that would be caused in the circumstances (Directive 70). Keeping
the issue of scandal in mind will ensure that institutional survival does not
depend upon sacrificing Catholic identity by wholesale accommodation or
by diluting any sense of wrongdoing. Yet, at the same time, the ambiguity
often caused by partnering with others must not be exaggerated to preclude
legitimate forms of cooperation. The bishops rightly encourage "an
increased collaboration among Catholic-sponsored health care institutions"
May, 2003
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but, by all means, we should resist the temptation to fall into a ghetto-like
mentality in Catholic health care.
Many new partnerships present a two-edged sword so that the
context in which scandal must be determined can be ambiguous. As the
bishops observe, "new partnerships can be viewed as opportunities for
Catholic health care institutions and services to witness to their religious
and ethical commitments ... New partnerships can help implement the
Church's social teaching." Yet, at the same time, "new partnerships can
pose serious challenges to the viability of the identity of Catholic health
care institutions and services, and their ability to implement these
Directives in a consistent way ... " While this ambiguity is present when
partnerships are formed with those who do not share Catholic moral
convictions, "the danger of creating misunderstanding must be carefully
avoided with the help of suitable explanation of what is going on."16
In addition, the assessment of the possibility of scandal requires a
nuanced consideration of the evil that may be involved in our cooperation.
For instance, to help in the determination of scandal, a distinction can be
made in terms of the gravity of the evil involved. Abortion and assisted
suicide are, for example, graver evils than reproductive technologies or, in
this case, sterilization. To attack and destroy human life is a graver evil than
bringing life about or suppressing the reproductive function. In light of the
distinction about the gravity of the matter, perhaps another axiom can be
formed to help guide a prudential assessment of the possibility of scandal:
the graver the evil, the higher the risk of scandal; and the higher the risk of
scandal, the more distant the Catholic partner must be from the
wrongdoing.

Conclusion
The moral tradition presented the principle of cooperation in the
language of wrongdoing. For a more positive understanding of the
principle, this grammar of wrongdoing needs to be completed by a
grammar of responsibility. This is particularly true when a public good like
health care is at stake. A grammar of responsibility does not lessen the need
for a careful scrutiny and an exact analysis of wrongdoing, but rather
completes it by focusing on the shared sense of the good life to be held in
common with all members of the community. A grammar of responsibility
would provide a broader and more adequate context in which to weigh the
goods and evils involved in any application of the principle, especially
though when the element of duress is a morally relevant factor in our
deliberations. Focusing on our responsibility to work with others is not
meant to compromise our moral integrity or water down our moral
teaching. The grammar of responsibility, rather, provides the proper
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perspective in which to consider the long term effects of our decisions, to
calculate the harms that we might bring about, and to realize the
importance of the goods that are threatened to be lost.
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